dated when events unfold quickly; as time went on, the  chop  chain  grew  longer  as  more  people demanded to have a chop. I strongly urge all PAOs to know your ship, the key players on your ship and other PAOs in the area. Most  important,  know  how  to  optimize  your  staff  or else no one will help you “juggle the feathers in a sudden  storm.” The  things  that  went  well  included  the following: . We gained instant credibility by inviting the media  on  board  for  a  highly  effective  media availability  within  30  minutes  of  returning  to Yokosuka. . The prepared adverse news release format was  entered  in  the  computer  before  getting  under way. . An accurate sequence of events was kept and double-checked against the damage control central log before it was included in the press kit. l   We   had   enough   command   “welcome aboard” pamphlets, 5- by 7-inch black-and-white photos  of  the  ship,  biographies  and  pictures  of  the CO  and  embarked  admiral  for  the  press  kits. .  After  the  initial  confusion,  we  maintained  a close, working relationship with the intelligence officers  who  wrote  OPREP-3s. . We recorded almost two hours of raw video footage.  Video  footage  of  the  damaged  spaces  was used by two investigative boards and the Naval Investigative  Service.  The  footage  of  the  mass casualties and Medevac was used by “Navy News This Week” and will be used by medical personnel for training. . Damage control diagrams that highlight the damaged   spaces   and   their   locations   were reproduced  for  visual  presentation.  The  large diagrams were displayed on an easel and copies were included in the press kits. .  A  Japanese  interpreter  from  COMNAV- FORJAPAN   enhanced   communications   at   the bilingual  media  availability. .  All  casualties  were  flown  off  the  ship  before arrival  in  Yokosuka. The  lessons  learned  from  the  USS  Midway disaster  included  the  following: .  Make  sure OP-Immediate. all press releases are sent via . Make sure the XO, CO, chief of staff of the embarked  flag  staff  and  admiral  approve  the message. . Make sure press releases are not sent before the  OPREP-3s. . Include only biographies of the speakers at the media availability in the press kits. . Establish contacts and good relations with operations  and  intelligence  personnel  before  an incident  takes  place. HURRICANE  HUGO Lt.  Cmdr.  John  Tull  of  the  Navy  Office  of Information   (NAVINFO)   New   England   gives   the following account of the public affairs actions taken after  Hurricane  Hugo: “Hugo  Who?”  is  a  popular  expression  in Charleston, South Carolina, now that recovery and restoration  efforts  are  gradually  reestablishing normal lifestyles, but make no mistake about it: During  the  night  of  September  21,  1989,  and extending   into   the   early   morning   hours   of September  22,  Hurricane  Hugo  had  the  undivided attention  a  Category  Five  hurricane  demands. For the Navy in Charleston, Hugo’s impact was described  as  “devastating,”  which  in  terms  of facilities, equipment and water damage–initially estimated  at  0  million–it  was.  However,  it  could have been far worse in terms of loss of life and injuries. Fortunately, no fatalities or serious injuries involving   active-duty   forces   or   their   families occurred during the storm. On  the  public  affairs  front,  response  to Hugo-related  needs  provided  some  valuable learning   experiences   for   PAOs.   From   those experiences came various observations and lessons learned,  including  the  following: l Navy Family Information Center and Hot Line–Establishment of a Navy Family Information Center  and  Hot  Line  at  the  Charleston  Naval Hospital on September 23 proved very useful in recovery   efforts   by   providing   information   on services  available,  getting  tiger  teams  to  families  in need, disseminating information on the return of 2-7